CNSC welcomes feedback on any regulatory document at any time REGDOC- supersedes RD, Design of New Nuclear Power. CNSC has issued its Fukushima report – posted on the CNSC website on that the design intent complies with CNSC design requirements (RD, RD-. Re: The Approvals Process for New Reactors in Canada – RD & RD ( CNSC) request for feedback on the comments received on the.
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To minimize radiation exposure, the plant layout provides for efficient operation, inspection, maintenance, and replacement. This approach identifies the need for such functions as reactor shutdown, emergency core cooling, containment, emergency rd-3337 removal, and power systems, etc.
RD-337: Design of New Nuclear Power Plants
System control interlocks are designed to minimize the likelihood of inadvertent manual or automatic override, and to provide for situations when it is necessary to override interlocks to use equipment in a non-standard way. The design provides a means i. The components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are designed, manufactured, and arranged in a manner that permits adequate inspections and tests of the boundary rc-337 the lifetime of the plant.
This source term is referred to as the reference source term, and is based on a set of representative core damage accidents established by the design authority. Similar to NS-R-1, RD considers all licensing phases, because information from the design process feeds into the processes for reviewing an application for a Licence to Construct an NPP, and other licence applications.
The design identifies cnscc radiological and combustible gas accident source term for use in the specification of the complementary design features for BDBAs. Test acceptance leakage rate limits are established for the entire containment system, and for individual components that can contribute significantly to leakage.
The design provides protection to workers and the public from event sequences initiated by fire or explosion in accordance with established radiological, toxicological, and human factors criteria.
Document History of REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants
The filtration system reliably achieves the necessary retention factors under the expected prevailing conditions, and is designed in a manner that facilitates appropriate efficiency testing.
Process system A system whose primary function is to support or contribute to the production of steam or electricity. The fuel is qualified for operation, either through experience with the same type of fuel in other reactors, or through a program of experimental testing and analysis, to ensure that fuel assembly requirements are met.
SSCs important to safety are designed and located in a manner that minimizes the probability and effects of fires and explosions caused by external or internal events. The design also facilitates monitoring in-service for degradations that may compromise the intended design function of the structures.
Defence-in-depth level two is achieved by controlling plant behaviour during and following a PIE using both inherent and engineered design features to minimize or exclude uncontrolled transients to the extent possible.
RD Design of New Nuclear Power Plants – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
As discussed in Section 9. Residual heat The sum of heat originating from radioactive decay, fission in the fuel in the shutdown state, and the heat stored in reactor related structures, systems and components. Environmental effects are considered in the design of civil structures and the selection of construction materials. Fail-safe design Design whose most probable failure modes do not result in a reduction re-337 safety.
Single failure A failure that results in the loss of capability of a system or component to perform its intended function s and any consequential failure s that result from it.
The control system, combined with the inherent characteristics of the cnnsc and the selected operating limits and conditions, minimize the need for shutdown action. The response time and speed of closure are in accordance with the acceptance criteria defined for postulated initiating events. These expectations are met following a common-cause loss of off-site power where this may occur as a result of a PIE, and in the presence of a single failure in the EPS.
Shutdown state Characterized by subcriticality of the reactor.
The design and the design process ensure compliance with the obligations arising from the safeguards agreement between Canada and the IAEA. All piping and vessels are typically separated from electrical and control systems to the extent practicable.
Adequate isolation is provided at the interfaces between the reactor coolant system RCS and connecting systems operating at lower pressures to prevent the overpressure of such systems and possible loss of coolant accidents. In the case of multi-unit plants, the use of available support from other units is relied upon only if it can be established that the safe operation of the other units is not compromised.
The design also considers the placement of civil utilities to minimize access requirements for such activities as repair and maintenance, in order to reduce threats to the protected area and vital areas.
Safety system A system provided to ensure the safe shutdown of the reactor or the residual heat removal from the core, or to limit the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents. Before the design is submitted, an independent peer review of the safety assessment is conducted by individuals or groups separate from those carrying out the design.
The design limits reflect the importance of preserving the cladding and fuel matrix, as these are the first barriers to fission product release. Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere, that penetrates the containment structure and is not part of a closed system, is to be provided with two isolation barriers that meet the following expectations:.
The design includes provisions to treat liquid and gaseous effluents in a manner that will keep the quantities and concentrations of discharged contaminants within prescribed limits, and that will support application of the ALARA principle.
Consistent with the concept of defence-in-depth, the design provides multiple barriers for protection against malevolent acts, including physical protection systems, engineered safety provisions, and measures for post-event management, as appropriate. At the design stage, consideration is given to long-term storage of irradiated fuel assemblies after discharge from the reactor.
The emergency support centre includes secure means of communication with the MCR, the SCR, and other important points in the plant, and with on-site and off-site emergency response organizations. The design supports maintenance of full functionality following a DBE of all parts of the containment system credited in the safety analysis. Best estimate Unbiased estimate obtained by the use of a mathematical model or calculation method to realistically predict plant behaviour and important parameters.
The design provides an adequately equipped emergency support centre, and plans for on-site and off-site emergency response. The auxiliary feedwater, boiler pressure control, and other auxiliary systems, prevent the escalation of AOOs to accident conditions. Postulated initiating events can lead to AOO or accident conditions, and include credible failures or malfunctions of SSCs, as well as operator errors, common-cause internal hazards, and external hazards.